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Summary. - The tax structure in Niger depends heavily on uranium mining and the rest of the 
formal sector. The slump in uranium prices has reduced tax revenues to 9% of GNP, which is not 
enough to finance an adequate level of public services. In this paper, tax reforms are considered 
which will raise more revenue while respecting criteria of equity, efficiency, and growth. The 
reforms mostly involve extending taxation into the informal sector, such as using external 
indicators of income in the administration of the income tax, and making greater use of taxes on 
buildings and motor vehicles. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years Niger has suffered from chronic 
fiscal troubles. The pattern is common to many 
impoverished countries of Africa: The price of 
the country’s principal export product collapses, 
reducing the government’s revenues; it proves 
politically difficult to reduce the level of public 
services and in particular the size of the bureauc- 
racy; the growing fiscal deficit is handled by a 
series of desperate stopgap measures - delaying 
payments to government workers and suppliers, 
borrowing where possible, and appealing to the 
international donors for assistance. The donors 
often respond by saying that the fiscal problems 
should be solved by thoroughgoing reform, 
which would address not only the growing deficit 
but also the numerous distortions and inequities 
caused by the tax system. Hence there is no lack 
of advice about how to address the fiscal crisis. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the main 
problems in Niger’s tax system, and to add to the 
unsolicited advice already in plentiful supply. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Niger covers a large area - more than France, 
Germany, and Poland combined. But the north- 
ern half of the country gets virtually no rainfall, 
and in that region, agricultural possibilities are 
extremely limited. Almost all of Niger’s eight 
million people live within 100 miles of its south- 
ern border. In that narrow belt, traditional 
farming and herding are the main activities, 
millet and sorghum are the main subsistence 
crops, and livestock and cowpeas are the main 
exports. Far to the north, the uranium mines 
developed with French, Japanese, and Spanish 
participation provide an important supplement to 
the country’s traditional sources of income. 
As in most African countries, there is a rather 
sharp division between the so-called formal and 
informal sectors of the economy. The formal 
sector makes extensive use of written records; 
the informal sector does not. This difference is of 
prime significance for public finance, since many 
taxes which are dependent on documentation 
and which can therefore work well in the formal 
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authors are grateful for the generous-spirited coopera- 
tion extended to them in Niamey by the staff of the 
Ministry of Finance, by respondents in several other 
public and private institutions, and by Frank Martin of 
the United States Agency for International Develop- 
ment. For comments on earlier versions of the paper, 
thanks are extended to Gerard Chambas, Henri Josser- 
and, Charles Steedman, and two anonymous referees. 
The authors alone, however, are responsible for the 
views expressed here. Final revision accepted: January 
27, 1993. 
1179 
1180 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
sector encounter serious administrative obstacles 
when applied to the informal sector. Besides 
traditional farming and herding, the informal 
sector in Niger includes an abundance of mercan- 
tile activities. Some of the merchants run large 
and complex operations, and much of the exten- 
sive trade with Nigeria to the south is under their 
control. The informal sector also includes a 
dynamic, small-scale manufacturing component. 
mostly found in the villages.’ 
The formal sector encompasses the uranium 
operations, the civil service, the state enterprises 
(not very numerous, and mostly engaged in the 
processing of agricultural products), a few for- 
eign enterprises, and some modern-style service 
businesses established by Nigeriens educated 
abroad.’ Together these activities probably 
account for little more than a third of the GNP 
(Joumard, Liedholm and Mead, 1992, p. 23). 
After obtaining its independence from France 
in 1960, Niger experienced two long-lived au- 
thoritarian regimes. Hamani Diori, a leader in 
the independence struggle, governed until 1974, 
when he was overthrown by Seyni Kountche in a 
military coup. Kountche held power until his 
death from natural causes in 1987. It was during 
his regime that Niger enjoyed its uranium boom. 
Not long after his death, pressures for democratic 
reform obliged his successor Ah Saibou to begin 
sharing power, and efforts are now under way to 
create a multi-party electoral system. 
The tax system which evolved from the colo- 
nial past and from the first 30 
Y 
ears of independ- 
ence is summarized in Table 1. There are several 
salient features of the system. 
First, as in virtually all low-income countries, a 
large fraction of total tax revenues is generated 
by international trade - 42% in the case of Niger 
in 1989. 
Second, SOMAIR and COMINAK, the two 
companies which comprise the uranium sector, 
furnish a large fraction of total tax receipts, as a 
result of paying production royalties, a special 
export tax, a profits tax, and income taxes on 
their employees’ wages. To this list might be 
added the extra tax revenues generated in other 
sectors due to the extra economic activity in- 
duced by uranium production. 
Third, there have been some significant fiscal 
changes since independence. The arrival of 
substantial revenues from uranium mining in the 
1970s permitted the virtual removal of the head 
tax and the livestock tax, traditional levies which 
had constituted significant burdens for the rural 
population. Some years later, in 1986, two 
turnover taxes were replaced by a value-added 
tax. Apart from these changes, most of the 
system inherited from the French colonial period 
is still intact. Thus income taxation involves first 
taxing each source of income (profits, wages, 
rent, etc.) under a separate “schedular” tax, then 
taxing the sum of income from all sources under a 
“general” tax. Some of the French legacies are 
truly antique. The business license tax (patenre), 
for example, is closely modeled on a levy dating 
back to the French Revolution. 
Fourth, reflecting the high degree of centrali- 
zation in French administrative tradition, the 
central government’s taxes generate far more 
revenue than do local taxes. Among the latter, 
head taxes in the villages and towns are of some 
importance, and there is also a proliferation of 
minor taxes on business operations, such as taxes 
on the occupancy of market stalls and taxes on 
advertising signs. The central government acts as 
the collection agency for most of the local taxes. 
Most of the local expenditures on supplies are 
also executed in fact by the central government, 
so local goverment is left with hardly more 
responsibility than the management of its own 
bureaucracy. 
This tax system will now be evaluated in terms 
of the following four criteria: 
(a) Revenue adequacy. Does the system gen- 
erate enough revenue to finance an appropri- 
ate level of public services? 
(b) Efficiency. Does the system promote an 
efficient allocation of resources? 
(c) Equity. Does the system result in a fair 
distribution of tax burdens among the diffe- 
rent economic groups of the population? 
(d) Growth. Does the system promote econo- 
mic growth? 
The criterion of revenue adequacy must evident- 
ly be applied to the tax system as a whole rather 
than to its separate parts. In our discussion here, 
the whole system is assessed according to the 
adequacy criterion, then the major components 
of the system are each assessed in turn according 
to the criteria of efficiency, equity, and growth. 
We are then in a position to apply those three 
criteria to the system as a whole, which is done in 
the concluding section. 
3. REVENUE ADEQUACY 
In 1989 central and local government tax 
revenues in Niger amounted to 9% of GNP. This 
“tax ratio” is very low by international standards. 
A compilation published by the International 
Monetary Fund (1986, p. 84) indicates that in 
1982 the mean ratio for developing countries was 
19.7%, while that for industrial countries was 
34.3%. 
The fact that Niger’s ratio is far below interna- 
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Table 1. Tax revenues in Niger, 1989 (in billions of CFA francs)* 
Income taxes 14.3 
General income tax (IGR) 4.1 
Schedular income taxes 
Industrial and commercial profits (BIC) 5.6 
Wages and salaries (ICTS) 3.0 
Income from financial investments (IRVM) 1.0 
Rental income (TVL) 0.6 
Taxes on internal trade 12.5 
Value-added tax (TVA) 5.8 
Uranium royalties 4.9 
Property transfer tax 0.9 
Tax on insurance contracts 0.4 
Stamp duties 0.5 
Taxes on international trade 
Imports 
Value-added tax (TVA) 
Fiscal duties (DF) 
Customs duties (DD) 
Statistical tax (TS) 
Tax on petroleum products (TPP) 
Tax on alcoholic beverages (TBA) 
Tax on tobacco products (TSB) 
Regional cooperation tax (TCR) 












Uranium export tax (DSU) 2.4 
Statistical tax 2.3 
Property taxes and license taxes 1.5 
Buildings tax (FB) 0.6 
Business license tax 0.7 
Motor vehicle license tax 0.2 
Local government taxes 4.1 
Other taxes 0.6 
Total tax revenues 57.0 
Source: Ministkre du Plan (1990). 
*French acronyms for the taxes are shown in parentheses. The 
CFA franc is tied to the French franc in a 5O:l ratio. In 1989 the 
exchange rate between the CFA franc and the US dollar averaged 
319:l. - 
tional norms does not by itself imply that the 
country has an inappropriately small public 
sector. It could be that the norms represent 
excessively large public sectors in the other 
countries, or that special conditions in Niger 
make a small public sector appropriate. Given 
Niger’s desire to raise its present level of de- 
velopment, however, it seems self-evident that 
the country ought to allocate more than 9% of its 
total income to certain critical activities which are 
unlikely to be forthcoming in quantity from the 
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private sector - activities such as the creation of 
human capital through education and health 
services; the creation and maintenance of physi- 
cal infrastructure in such sectors as transporta- 
tion, communications, irrigation, electricity sup- 
ply, sanitation, and household water supply; and 
the provision of internal and external security. 
Hence the tax system in Niger cannot reasonably 
be said to generate an adequate level of revenue. 
A few years ago, the level of tax revenue was 
closer to being adequate. In 1980 central govern- 
1182 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
ment tax revenue, which has typically accounted 
for well over nine-tenths of total tax revenue, 
amounted to 12.4% of GNP. This was the height 
of Niger’s uranium boom, when the export price 
reached levels not seen before or since. We have 
noted from Table 1 the central role of the 
uranium sector in the tax system. The same point 
is made in Figures 1 and 2. There is clearly a close 
correlation between the curve for mining output 
as a percentage of product (Figure 1) and the 
curve for “actual total taxes” as a percentage of 
product (Figure 2). The least-squares regression 
relationship between the two variables during 
197S89 is as follows: 
TAXIGNP = 5.23 + 0.555 MINIGNP [R2 = 0.921 
(0.039) 
TAX/GNP is central government tax revenue as 
a percentage of GNP, and MINIGNP is value 
added in modern-sector mining as a percentage 
of GNP.4 The high R* means that virtually all of 
the fluctuations in the tax ratio are explained by 
the varying fortunes of the uranium sector. The 
Figure 1. Mining output as a percentage of GNP 




Data are for central government revenue only. 
Sources: World Bank, World Tables; Minis&e du 
Plan, Annuaire Statistique. 
Figure 2. Tax revenue as a percentage of GNP. 
point is clearly depicted when we add to Figure 2 
the bold curve for TAXIGNP as predicted by the 
regression equation. The correspondence be- 
tween that bold curve and the light curve for 
actual TAX/GNP is very close. 
Further, it is clear from Figure 2 that the 
uranium sector has a dominant influence on all of 
the three broad categories of tax revenue shown 
there: the income taxes (including the profits 
taxes and wages taxes paid by the uranium 
companies), the taxes on international trade 
(including the uranium export tax), and other 
taxes (including the uranium royalties). 
Briefly put, the fiscal experience of Niger since 
1980 has been an attempt to maintain public 
expenditures at their boom levels in the face of 
an inexorably shrinking tax ratio. Expenditures 
from the general budget stayed close to 14% of 
GNP throughout the 1980s (Minis&e du Plan, 
1991). But revenues could not keep pace. The tax 
structure was rigidly tied to uranium mining and 
the rest of the formal sector, and the decline in 
uranium entailed a decline in tax revenue. The 
government’s attempts to resist this process by 
raising tax rates, bringing in the value-added tax, 
and strengthening enforcement were all futile. 
These measures simply stimulated evasion and a 
transfer of operations out of the formal sector - 
la fuite vers l’informel, as it is commonly called in 
Niger. 
The growing gap between politically necessary 
expenditures and shrinking receipts was covered 
by a variety of emergency solutions. One step 
which governments often resort to in these 
circumstances-printing enough money to cover 
the deficit - is not available to Niger, which as a 
member of the franc zone has only limited 
discretionary powers of monetary expansion. But 
other stopgaps were found. There was increasing 
resort to outside borrowing, and the central 
government’s external debt more than doubled 
during 1984-88. The international donors were 
approached for grants, and France in particular, 
as the former colonial power, could often be 
counted on to respond.5 Treasury officials 
appealed to local enterprises to pay their taxes 
early, and some of them, particularly those run 
by foreigners, considered it politic to comply. 
Bills submitted by local suppliers to the govern- 
ment were left unpaid, and starting around 1990, 
there were substantial delays in the payment of 
government salaries. Some of the government 
workers accepted their fate philosophically, talk- 
ing of their “60-day months” (Martineau, 1992). 
Others were less passive, and the armed forces 
reacted on occasion with mutiny.6 The manage- 
ment of the budget deficit in Niger has become 
an exciting affair. 
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In both national and international circles, 
there is agreement that Niger’s budgetary deficit 
ought to be reduced, but there are differences on 
how that should be achieved. The donors and in 
particular the International Monetary Fund put 
considerable emphasis on expenditure reduction 
(though they also have some ideas on tax 
reform). The Nigerien view, as expressed for 
example by Prime Minister Amadou Cheiffou in 
1992, is that public expenditure is already at a 
bare-bones level: he cited a current ratio of one 
government employee in Niger for every 215 
inhabitants, which can hardly be regarded as 
excessive.’ This view - that development- 
related public services in Niger are already at 
minimal levels - implies that deficit reduction 
ought to be accomplished primarily by raising the 
tax ratio. The current ratio of 9%, as we argued 
above, is clearly inadequate. But the lesson of 
the last 10 years, as dramatically depicted in 
Figures 1 and 2, is that the existing tax structure 
does not permit a significant rise in the tax ratio 
so long as the uranium market remains depres- 
sed. Fundamental changes in the structure are 
required. 
It should be stressed that our argument in 
favor of an increase in Niger’s tax ratio is 
intended to permit the financing of essential 
services without excessive deficits. Some reduc- 
tion in government expenditure is no doubt 
justifiable, since cases of overstaffing and unwar- 
ranted subsidies are as prevalent in Niger as 
elsewhere, but a reduction back to the vicinity of 
9% of GNP would seriously handicap the coun- 
try’s development efforts. 
We now turn to the specific taxes in the 
Nigerien system, to see what structural changes 
might permit a quantum increase in the overall 
tax ratio, while respecting the additional criteria 
of equity, efficiency, and growth. 
4. INCOME TAXES 
The system of income taxation in Niger is by its 
nature horizontally inequitable, in the sense that 
persons with the same total income pay radically 
different amounts in tax, depending on the form 
in which that income is received. Four types of 
income - profits, wages, rent, and income from 
financial investments - are taxed at different flat 
rates under the “schedular” income taxes, and 
their sum is then taxed at graduated rates under 
the general income tax.s Dividend income is the 
hardest hit, since the company profits out of 
which the dividends are paid are taxed by the 
profits tax at 45%, the dividends themselves are 
then taxed at 20% by the tax on income from 
financial investments, and the same dividends are 
then taxed once more under the general income 
tax at rates which can reach as high as 60%.” 
Abolishing the schedular taxes would tend to 
improve the system’s “horizontal” equity. A 
reform of this nature should also be conducive to 
growth, since the schedular taxes are mostly 
applied to capital income. Their removal would 
raise the after-tax rate of return on saving, and 
should therefore stimulate private saving and 
investment. 
There is, however, a case for retaining some of 
the schedular taxes as withholding devices. The 
case certainly applies to the schedular tax on 
profits, which could be converted into a system 
for withholding the taxes payable on profit 
income under the general income tax. This could 
be achieved through a plan for “full integration” 
of corporate and individual income taxes as 
discussed in the public finance literature.‘” 
Under such a plan, individuals receiving profit 
income include in their income subject to general 
income tax their share of company profits before 
the application of the profits tax; they then 
calculate the general income tax due on their 
total income, and deduct from this provisional 
tax liability the profits tax already paid on their 
share of profits. The net result is to avoid the 
double taxation arising from taxing profits first at 
the corporate level and then again without 
adjustment at the individual level. 
The multiple taxation of profits is, of course, 
not unique to Niger. Most countries with profits 
taxes fail to correct the problem. But with full 
integration of the kind suggested here, the profits 
tax in Niger would only impose burdens on 
foreign owners and on Nigerien residents omit- 
ting to file general income tax returns. In a 
similar spirit, it may be desirable to retain the 
schedular income tax on wages and salaries as a 
withholding device, it being understood that the 
taxes withheld would be fully credited against the 
general income tax. 
With the removal of the schedular taxes, 
except as withholding devices, the general in- 
come tax would remain as the main tax instru- 
ment for achieving “vertical” equity - that is, 
the desired degree of tax progressivity or income 
redistribution. In principle, the structural fea- 
tures of the income tax - the widths of the tax 
brackets, the rates applying in the different 
brackets, the exemptions and deductions - 
could be adjusted to help achieve whatever 
distributional goals were adopted. 
Next, we note that the existing income tax 
system is almost wholly limited to the formal 
sector. In a country with eight million people, the 
profits tax in 1991 was paid by about 200 
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companies, the schedular tax on wages was paid 
by about 2,000 individuals, and there were about 
30,000 general income tax returns. The limited 
coverage of the income taxes is partly due to the 
rather high exemptions permitted under the 
general income tax and the wages tax. But it is 
also due to widespread evasion. Where written 
records are incomplete or nonexistent, as in the 
informal sector, the information required for 
levying the income taxes is not available. The tax 
authorities have tried to solve this problem, at 
least in the case of the profits tax, by requiring 
informal-sector businesses to pay an imputed tax 
(impbt forfuitaire). This is supposed to be based 
on profits estimated from external indicators like 
the size of the premises occupied and the nature 
of the business. But the process of estimation has 
not been clearly codified. The imputed taxes end 
up being matters of negotiation between tax- 
payer and tax collector. and contribute only 
trivial sums to the Treasury. 
The fact that the income taxes are essentially 
confined to the formal sector causes problems for 
revenue adequacy, equity, and efficiency. Much 
revenue is lost by the failure to reach the many 
substantial incomes generated in the informal 
sector. Equity is flouted, since formal-sector 
incomes are taxed much more heavily than are 
informal-sector incomes of the same size. The tax 
system discourages businesses from adopting 
modern methods and thereby becoming more 
visible, so efficiency suffers. 
One solution to these problems which deserves 
serious study is to restructure the existing general 
income tax so that it can be readily applied to the 
informal sector. This might be done by further 
development of the forfuitaire principle just 
referred to. In the case of the general income tax, 
this means that the tax authorities would supple- 
ment the declarations of taxpayers with imputa- 
tions of their income based on certain external 
indicators. For this approach to work, the indica- 
tors would have to be closely correlated with 
income and readily observable in both the formal 
and the informal sectors. Examples are four 
types of household assets: houses, cars, tele- 
phones, and electricity connections. Affluent 
informal-sector operators possess all of them, 
and all of them are already registered with the 
authorities. 
The official records of these assets include 
various details - the construction material used 
in housing, the floor space, the location of the 
house, the make of car - which would permit 
further refinements in imputing income. It would 
be important in this regard to base the imputa- 
tion of income and hence the calculation of tax 
liability on the possession of assets rather than on 
the consumption of products (e.g., the number of 
kilowatts consumed, or the number of telephone 
calls made). Otherwise there would be a stronger 
tendency for the imputed income tax to distort 
expenditure patterns, as households attempt to 
minimize their taxes. For similar reasons, it 
would be important to base the imputation of 
income on assets which do not have close 
substitutes. 
The rate structure of the general income tax 
also needs some attention. There are now eight 
brackets of taxable income, with the marginal 
rates of taxation ranging from 2% up to 60%. It 
can be argued that the lowest rates are too low. 
and the highest rates too high. The revenue 
yielded by the lowest rates hardly justifies the 
considerable collection and compliance costs for 
those households - relatively numerous - who 
are taxed only at those rates. The top rates 
simply encourage evasion, with deleterious 
effects on revenue adequacy, economic effici- 
ency, and equity. 
A better rate schedule might contain only 
three brackets, with marginal rates of 10%) 20%, 
and 30%. As already noted, the widths of the 
brackets (and the level of exempted income) 
should correspond to vertical equity goals. and 
should also be set to help achieve whatever 
revenue target is desired. 
5. TAXES ON INTERNAL TRADE 
In terms of revenue yield, the main taxes on 
internal trade are the uranium production royalty 
and the value-added tax. The uranium royalty 
presents no problems of collection, since there 
are only two companies which are liable for it. 
Whether the present rate of the royalty is optimal 
is another matter. One can accept as a reasonable 
fiscal goal that the government of Niger should 
maximize its extraction of the economic rent 
generated by the uranium deposits. The gov- 
ernment’s actual share of the rent is essentially 
determined through negotiation with the French 
government and the other foreign investors 
participating in production. The negotiations 
cover not only what rate of royalty will be levied 
but also other tax liabilities (e.g.. the uranium 
export tax), what price will be paid by French 
importers (the main purchasers of the product, at 
a price often well above the world price), how 
much ore will be mined, who will be employed in 
the work force, who will pay for the maintenance 
of the long public road leading to the mines, and 
so forth. We attempt no analysis here of that 
multidimensional game. 
By contrast, the value-added tax poses major 
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problems of collection. The tax is of the credit 
variety, widely adopted in Europe and elsewhere 
over the last 30 years. Under this arrangement, 
the enterprise collects taxes calculated on its 
gross sales, and then transfers to the Treasury 
those collections minus a credit for the taxes 
charged on its own purchases, as confirmed by 
invoices. For proper enforcement, the arrange- 
ment obviously requires high standards of 
record-keeping. In Niger the tax authorities have 
found about 800 enterprises with records ade- 
quate for value-added taxation. Enterprises with 
inadequate records are supposed to be taxed on 
an imputed orforfaituire basis similar to that used 
for the profits tax. Another 4,000 enterprises are 
reached in this way. But as with the profits tax, 
the imputed payments are negligible. 
The value-added tax is widely resented by the 
business community in Niger. The rates of 
taxation which were applied when the tax was 
introduced in 1986 aroused vigorous protest, and 
the authorities soon felt obliged to reduce the 
standard rate from 25% to 17%.” Five years 
later, the merchants in one large market in 
Niamey were still refusing to collect the tax, and 
the government had chosen not to force the 
issue. Cooperation with the tax authorities in 
Niamey may be less than ideal, but matters in the 
rest of the country are even worse. In a recent 
survey of small enterprises, Joumard, Liedholm 
and Mead (1992), found that 23.3% of the 
sampled enterprises located in Niamey were 
paying the value-added tax, but the figure for the 
rest of the country was only 1.3%. 
The administration of the tax seems to be 
degenerating, since year by year its total receipts 
keep declining, at a rate faster than can be 
explained by the uranium slump. Arrears in the 
payment of the tax are widespread and chronic. 
The poor performance of the tax can be captured 
in one statistic: in 1989 its revenues equaled 2% 
of GNP. If the value-added tax were universally 
levied at a standard rate of 17%, it ought to yield 
revenues in the neighbourhood of 17% of GNP. 
Some of the discrepancy here is due to the fact 
that much of the GNP is nonmarketed, but on 
top of that, there is extensive evasion. 
The value-added tax does not seem to be 
making many positive contributions to Niger’s 
fiscal system. Its shrinking yield weakens the 
system’s ability to generate adequate revenues. 
Since it is overwhelmingly a formal-sector tax, it 
creates additional inducements for resources to 
shift into the informal sector, with many resulting 
inefficiencies. Since it is applied in a haphazard 
manner, it is impossible to judge whether its 
impact on the distribution of real income is 
equitable. 
In a high-income setting, the value-added tax 
has a number of advantages, particularly when 
judged by the criteria of efficiency and growth. 
But its adoption in Niger seems to be an example 
of a transfer of inappropriate technology. Should 
the tax be abolished? Considerations of realpoli- 
tik suggest that abolition is unlikely. The tax was 
adopted at the strong urging of the French 
government and the International Monetary 
Fund, who have also promoted it in many other 
countries.12 Their views on the tax have not 
changed, and their views still carry some weight 
in Niamey. It may, however, be possible to 
rehabilitate the tax to a degree. The tax rate is 
still so high as to cause substantial evasion. 
Reducing the rate yet again may slow Zufuite vers 
f’informel. It is even conceivable that in the case 
of its value-added tax, Niger is on the negatively 
sloped portion of a Laffer curve, and that rate 
reduction might increase the tax yield. Encourag- 
ing evidence that the yield could be increased is 
provided by the turnover taxes which were 
replaced by the value-added tax. In some years, 
they generated revenues nearly twice the current 
yield of the value-added tax. 
6. TAXES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
As is clear from Table 1, the structure of taxes 
on Niger’s international trade has become rather 
complex. Value-added taxes are applied to im- 
ports, and can then be claimed as a credit against 
the internal value-added taxes collected at later 
stages in the process of production and distribu- 
tion. There is also a bundle of other import 
charges - droit de douane, droit fiscal, droit 
statistique, taxes sphzifiques. Other levies are 
applied to exports. 
The most salient feature of the taxes on 
international trade is that they are widely eva- 
ded. It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise 
in Niger’s geographical situation. The country’s 
frontiers stretch for about 3,500 miles, mostly 
across desert and savanna, and the smugglers 
have all the advantages over the small corps of 
customs officials. The so-called “mobile briga- 
des” which are supposed to intercept smugglers 
are often not mobile at all. Their vehicles are 
frequently in disrepair, and their radios do not 
work. The local population, which depends on 
smuggling for a livelihood, is sometimes un- 
cooperative, to put it mildly (Thill, Berthier and 
Bezard, 1990, p. 26). 
The advantages enjoyed by the smugglers have 
been strengthened in recent years by the arrival 
of the Toyota Land Cruiser in the region. Its 
speed and durability in the hands of the smug- 
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glers leave the officials impuissants, as one of 
them told us. It is a remarkably versatile vehicle 
which, as someone has pointed out, was a 
decisive factor in the civil war in Chad next door, 
and is now creating an unofficial free trade zone. 
If the smugglers cannot escape, they can try 
bribery, which is allegedly common. If that does 
not work, and the officials press charges, the 
smugglers often go free anyway, thanks to the 
intervention of a local political boss (Thill, 
Berthier and Bezard, 1990, p. 30). 
Most of the crossborder trade seems to escape 
taxation. The products where evasion is especi- 
ally notorious are the cigarettes imported 
through Benin, the livestock exported to Nigeria, 
and the gasoline imported from Nigeria. In the 
case of gasoline, the combination of a high 
official price in Niger, a heavily subsidized price 
in Nigeria, an overvaluation of Niger’s CFA 
franc relative to Nigeria’s naira, and high import 
taxes in Niger has created irresistible incentives 
for smuggling. By 1991, 22 out of Niger’s X2 
formal-sector gasoline stations had reportedly 
shut down for lack of business (Mahamadou. 
1991, p. 11). Many of the stations remaining open 
had no other customers besides government 
employees using the gasoline coupons they had 
been given for official travel. It is a classic case of 
la fitire vers l’informel, where the informel in this 
instance is represented by young entrepreneurs 
standing along rural roads beside their jerry cans. 
and waving a funnel at passing motorists. Their 
price is sometimes as low as one-fourth of the 
official pump price. 
Nonetheless, Niger’s customs officials do man- 
age to collect some taxes. In 1989 their collec- 
tions amounted to nearly 4”% of the country’s 
GNP. In evaluating this part of the tax system, 
one quickly encounters a well-known dilemma. 
Unless subsequently refunded, taxes on interna- 
tional trade cause inefficiencies in resource allo- 
cation, detracting from the pursuit of compara- 
tive advantage. On the other hand, essential 
public services need to be financed, and in low- 
income countries there are not many other tax 
handles besides international trade. Some com- 
promise must be reached. 
In Niger the current compromise may not be 
the best possible. As in the case of value-added 
taxation. further reduction in rates - at least for 
some products - could lead to an increase in tax 
yield, besides improving resource allocation. The 
customs authorities themselves are skeptical on 
this point. They note that a recent major 
reduction in import tax rates was followed by a 
major reduction in import tax receipts. The tax 
cut, however. took place in a context of declining 
economic activity, and there may also have been 
some weakening of the enforcement effort. The 
entire episode deserves to be more carefully 
studied. 
7. PROPERTY TAXES AND LICENSE 
TAXES 
Finally we consider a miscellaneous group of 
taxes on property values and on licenses. These 
two categories shade into each other: a motor 
vehicle license tax, for example, has many of the 
characteristics of a property tax on vehicles. 
Certain forms of property taxation have definite 
potential in low-income countries, and are often 
recommended by outside observers. ” A tax on 
urban housing has particular appeal. It has a base 
which is readily identifiable; it provides a means 
of reaching the informal sector; and it can be 
structured to achieve equity goals. 
In Niger, the Cadastral Service has surveyed 
all urban housing, but only rented dwellings are 
taxed. Since 1986, owner-occupied housing has 
been exempted from the buildings tax. The 
situation is of clear benefit to the affluent class - 
high-ranking civil servants, other formal-sector 
notables, and successful operators in the informal 
sector. 
The story is somewhat similar with motor 
vehicles. Here is another major form of property 
which is comprehensively registered, used in 
both the formal and informal sectors, and corre- 
lated with income ~ hence a good candidate for 
taxation. In Niger the existing tax on motor 
vehicle licenses reaches only a small part of the 
taxable capacity represented by motor vehicle 
ownership. The size of that capacity has been 
documented by a recent study of Niger’s road 
transportation sector (Mead et al., 1990). The 
authors estimate persuasively that the bribes paid 
by drivers at unauthorized but officially tolerated 
police roadblocks throughout the country 
amount to no less than 11 billion CFA francs per 
year. These payments, known whimsically in that 
part of the world as la taxe sauvage. are equal to 
about 20% of total official tax revenues in Niger. 
The transporters evidently find it profitable to 
stay in business, despite having to pay these 
charges. To improve economic efficiency and 
increase public revenues, the government should 
consider getting rid of the roadblocks and in- 
creasing the license tax. The rent previously 
appropriated at the roadblocks could be divided 
between the transporters and the government, 
with part of the government’s extra revenue to be 
spent on preventing the roadblocks from reap- 
pearing (better supervision. higher salaries for 
police). 
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Most of the other license taxes in Niger have 
little or no justification for their retention. The 
business license tax, which dates back to the 
French Revolution, imposes arbitrary burdens on 
business operators according to their occupa- 
tional classification. The survey by Joumard, 
Liedholm and Mead (1992) found business 
license tax payments ranging from 1.1% of 
annual sales for food retailing firms up to 13.3% 
for metalworking firms, a variation defying 
economic logic. Despite employing a large num- 
ber of collection agents, by the standards of 
Niger, the tax provides only about 1% of total tax 
revenue. It does have the virtue of reaching the 
informal sector, but in a manner which discour- 
ages cooperation. Evidently its main practical 
justification is as an instrument of political 
control: it provides a means whereby the author- 
ities can keep informed about developments in 
the small-scale commercial and manufacturing 
sectors. The fiscal analyst cannot sympathize 
with the technique of using taxes to accomplish 
such objectives. 
Some license taxes at the local level are 
similarly questionable. In the surveys conducted 
by Mead et al. (1990), it was found that the 
village taxes on the occupancy of market stalls 
were regressive and a significant deterrent to 
commerce. The same has been said of the 
municipal taxes on advertising signs. These levies 
- along with many others throughout Niger’s tax 
system - seem to create economic distortions all 
out of proportion to the meager amounts of 
revenue which they generate. 
CONCLUSIONS 
To synthesize the discussion of the previous 
sections, we can ask how the Nigerien tax system 
as a whole should be rated, using the four criteria 
proposed at the outset. As regards revenue 
adequacy, we have argued that the system is 
deficient. As regards efficiency, the selective 
nature of the taxes on income and trade distort 
business decisions about what to produce, what 
inputs to use, and what scale of operations to 
attain. In general, the taxes create incentives to 
operate outside the formal sector. Enterprises 
are kept small in order to escape notice, new 
technologies are ignored for similar reasons, 
formal record-keeping is avoided (or at least 
concealed) in order that forfaitaire status can be 
claimed, and so forth. 
To assess the equity of the tax system as such, it 
would be necessary to have available the results 
of a comprehensive survey of household income, 
expenditures, and assets. (To assess the equity of 
the fiscal system as a whole, it would also be 
necessary to analyze the pattern of benefits from 
government expenditures. This pattern could 
well be elitist, but that takes us too far afield.) In 
the absence of survey information permitting the 
measurement of tax incidence, some qualitative 
judgements can nonetheless be made. The tax 
system does possess some progressive elements: 
the exemptions permitted under the schedular 
and general income taxes, the graduated rate 
schedule of the general income tax, and the 
higher rates of value-added taxation applied to 
luxury products. These features are offset to an 
unknown degree by the regressive tendencies of a 
tax structure based largely on consumption. But 
from an equity standpoint, the system’s most 
obvious feature is perhaps its horizontal inequity. 
Households at the same economic level are taxed 
at very different rates, depending on how they 
receive or spend their income. These dispari- 
ties are well known, and result in even more 
strenuous efforts at evasion. 
As for growth, there too the picture is mixed. 
The nontaxation of most investment income 
generated by the informal sector presumably 
raises the economy-wide after-tax rate of return 
on investment, and hence contributes to a higher 
rate of capital formation. The heavy taxation, 
however, of investment income generated by the 
formal sector must have the opposite effect. 
Further negative effects on growth must come 
from the tax-induced bias against the adoption of 
new technology and other forms of moderniza- 
tion. 
To solve some of these problems, various 
suggestions have been made in the preceding 
sections. In sum, they consist of developing 
imputational procedures under the general in- 
come tax, repealing the schedular income taxes 
except as tax-withholding devices, lowering the 
rates of value-added and customs taxation, and 
increasing property taxes on vehicles and owner- 
occupied buildings. If these suggestions were 
implemented, the modified tax system might 
produce revenue as indicated below, after a fairly 
short period of adaptation (see Table 2). The 
estimates in Table 2 assume that the value of 
uranium output remains at the 1989 level. They 
also assume the abolition of the distortionary 
levies on business activities such as the business 
license tax and the local taxes on market stalls. 
Two final points should be made, the first one 
political. The fiscal plan proposed here involves 
the bureaucracy imposing heavier taxes on some 
informal sector incomes. The politics of the plan 
is therefore not without complications, since the 
ethnic group which has controlled the bureau- 
cracy since independence is not the same as the 
118X WORLD DEVELOPMENT 









General income tax, applying to actual and imputed 3.0 
incomes and integrated with profits tax 
Profits tax 1 .o 
Uranium royalties and uranium export tax 1.5 
Value-added tax and other taxes on internal and 5.0 
international trade, at lower rates 
Property taxes on buildings and motor vehicles 3.0 




roup which dominates the informal 
sector.’ Heavier taxation of the informal sector 
is probably only feasible if that sector participates 
fully in political decision making. Hence the 
democratization now under way in Niger might 
well be a precondition for successful tax reform. 
This last point is reinforced when one considers 
that democratization is likely to lead to a streng- 
thening of local governments, and to the de- 
velopment of their own tax bases. This process 
could ease the fiscal difficulties of the central 
government. 
The second point concerns the technology of 
tax collection. Advances in computer technology 
have created many new possibilities for tax 
enforcement. For a country such as Niger. the 
establishment of a national tax registry seems 
well within present administrative capabilities. 
Such a registry would bring together for each 
taxpayer all information relevant for determining 
tax liability: formal-sector wages and investment 
income, house type and value, motor vehicle 
data, telephone and electricity connections, and 
so forth. In the case of Niger the total number of 
separate taxpaying units under the plan proposed 
here would not exceed 50,000 (excluding border- 
crossers paying customs taxes). Hence the tax 
registry might even be managed on a single large- 
capacity microcomputer. Of course, in this area 
too, democratic reform might be a precondition 
for success. Otherwise the tax registry would 
probably be viewed as yet another instrument of 
political control. 
NOTES 
1. For a detailed analysis of small-scale informal- 
sector enterprises in Niger, see Mead et al. (1990). 
2. For a detailed analysis of the private sector in 
Niger, including both formal-sector and informal-sector 
enterprises, see Courcelle and de Lattre (1988). 
3. For more detailed descriptions of the system, see 
Barlow and Snyder (1991), Chambas (1991), and the 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (various 
years) 
4. The number in parentheses is the standard error 
of the coefficient. Chambas (1991) obtains a closely 
similar regression result, using some slightly different 
data series and a slightly shorter period of analysis. The 
coefficient of 0.555 on the mining output variable 
implies that an extra 100 million francs of mining 
output generates additional taxes of 55.5 million francs, 
both directly and indirectly. In view of the multiplicity 
of taxes paid by the uranium sector and the importance 
of the sector’s indirect contribution to tax revenues, the 
coefficient’s value is quite plausible. 
5. Some of the requests for funds passed through 
indirect channels. Kpatinde (1992, p. 24) tells of the 
Nigerien leaders asking President Houphouet-Boigny 
of the CAte d’Ivoire to make a special appeal on their 
behalf to President Mitterand. The French government 
responded with a geste of three billion CFA francs 
(about $10 million). 
6. One of the mutinies occurred in connection with 
Niger’s participation in Operation Desert Storm in 
1991. An army contingent was sent to join the coalition 
forces in Saudi Arabia. The government of Kuwait sent 
money to Niamey to be paid to the soldiers on their 
return. When the soldiers returned, they were told the 
money had already been spent. They refused to turn in 
their weapons, but were eventually paid. 
7. See Martineau (1992). To reinforce the point, one 
could note that about 37 of those 215 inhabitants are 
chldren aged 611. who ought to be in school and 
occupying the attention of at least one teacher. 
8. Formally speaking, the tax on rental income (tuxe 
sur la vhleur locative) is not counted as a schedular 
income tax, but it effectively belongs in that category. 
9. The schedular and general income taxes are 
partially integrated in the sense that schedular tax 
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payments are deductible from income subject to the 12. The spread of the value-added tax across the 
general tax. Third World is amply documented by Tait (1988). 
10. See, for example, Stiglitz (1986), pp. 464-467. 13. See, for example, World Bank (1988). pp. 161- 
162. 
11. Three rates are applied by the value-added tax: a 
rate higher than the standard rate for some luxury 14. For an extended discussion of these matters, see 
commodities, and a rate lower than the standard rate Charlick (1991). 
for some necessities. 
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